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I. GEOGRAPHIC NORTH VERSUS MAGNETIC NORTJI TO PROVIDE ENUANCED 
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM SAFETY- Michael K. Larson, University of Nebraska at 
Omaha 
One of the most dramatic changes in aviation navigation is taking place as the ground-
based VORis being replaced by the satellite-based GPS as the primary navigational facility in 
the National Airspace System {NAS). The most recent Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) 
proposes that by 2013 only a skeletal system ofVOR!DMEs will serve in a supponive role to the 
GPS based enroute navigation system. The capabilities of GPS present many potential 
enhancements to the efficacy and safety of the NAS. But, like many other high technology 
aircraft and flight systems, GPS can add complexity and, thus, workload for pilots. A concerted 
effort must be made to find means to simplifY pilot operations in order to avoid work-overload 
conditions leading to loss of situational awareness. 
One such proposal takes advantage of the simpler navigation operation procedures 
provided by a Geographic Nonh based model versus the current Magnetic North based model. 
GPS receivers automatically provide position with respect to longitude and latitude and motion 
with respect to Geographic (Tru~) North along a Great Circle track. Thus. with the GPS and a 
Geographic North based paradigm, procedures of converting true courses to magnetic headings 
by applying wind correction angles, magnetic variations, and magnetic deviations are no longer 
required. Additionally, magnetic disturbances and dip errors become irrelevant; and wind 
correction angle compensation becomes unnecessary for intercepting/tracking procedures and 
ATC vector. 
II. WEATHER SAFETY TRAINING FOR GENERAL AVIATION PILOTS mROUGH 
THE USE OF COMPUTER FLIGHT SIMULATION - David Widuaf, Utah State University 
Flight into Instrument meteorological conditions is the leading cause of General Aviation 
fatal accidents. This has been a persistent trend over many years. This proposal offers a 
possible solution to reduce these fatal accidents. Indicated in the proposal is the use of 
Computer-Based Training (CBT) through existing Personal Computer Aviation Training 
Devices (PC-A TO). These PC simulators would be used to develop hands-on training scenarios 
for beginning pilots and recurrent training for experienced pilots. Pilots would be placed in 
simulated weather conditions they would not normally see and evaluate and improve their 
reactions to these scenarios. The conceptual design of this study is presented for expert 
participation in the conceptualization of research phase. 
m. IDENTIFICATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 
SAFETY ISSUES- Chien-tsung Lu, University of Nebraska at Omaha 
During the past few decades. the Federal Aviation Administration, the National 
Transponation Safety Board, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, aircraft 
manufacturers, and other safety advocate groups have conducted numerous research projects on 
the topic of human behavior. The majority of the research conducted was related to flight crew 
behavior. The main purpose of this project is to focus on human behavior issues related to 
maintenance technicians. The selected methodology, a survey, will be administered to 
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maintenance personnel and the results analyzed to identity needs for future human factors 
training. 
IV. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CURRICULUM 
DEVELOPMENT- Michaela Schaaf and Brent Bowen, University of Nebraska at Omaha 
Curriculum development can be achieved through the application of the research model. 
A new upper-level aviation course at the University ofNebraska at Omaha followed such a plan. 
The course, Airpon Safety and Security, was conceived following the crash of TWA 800 and the 
subseq•Jent White House Commission and the growing awareness of emergency planning and 
disaster response in aviation. The course was developed utilizing research into the curriculum 
needs in this area, including discussions ,,.,ith industry and government expens. The results of 
this research revealed components for inclusion, such as airpon and ramp safety, OSHA 
requirements, risk assessment and management, disaster preparedness, emergency response 
plans, coordination among authorities, crisis communication, and passenger rights. The research 
also revealed that the structure of such a course lends itself to a seminar format and required 
many areas of expertise. 
V. THE COLLEGIATE AVIATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE CHECKLIST: 
FUNDAMENTAL PRE-CRISIS PLANNING- Mary Fink and Michael Larson, University of 
Nebraska at Omaha 
The University ofNebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute's commitment to the provision 
of a safe learning environment both in the classroom and in the air has led to the creation and 
adoption of an Emergency Response Checklist to be utilized in the event that a flight student is 
involved in an aircraft accident or incident. The plan came to fruition as the result ofbest 
practices research which examined crisis management plans at several regional flight training 
providers. Four Midwestern universities with aviation programs and one Air Force flying club 
were polled regarding current crisis procedures. At the time of the initial study, only one of the 
flight training providers possessed a crisis response plan. This plan outlines the roles of the flight 
vendor, as well as those of University ofNebraska at Omaha Campus Security, Student Affairs, 
University Relations, and the Aviation Institute. The goal oftrus plan is to eliminate uncenainty 
and assure that emergencies are responded to in an efficient manner with a clear and open flow 
of communication among all designated channels. As a result of this study, the Aviation Institute 
has implemented its own Emergency Response Checklist with all applicable university channels 
and contracted flight vendors. The outline of the checklist will be provided for review, comment 
and potential adoption by collegiate aviation flight training programs. 
VI. SYSTEMIC INITIATIVES IN AVIATION SAFETY RESEARCH- Brent D. Bowen, 
University ofNebraska at Omaha 
The scope of need in aviation safety research is daunting. Whenever we learn of tragedy 
we consider if. through enhanced knowledge, we could prevent another loss. At the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute, a key tenet in our mission "advocates the development of 
improved aviation/aerospace systems while funhering their integration into the overall modal 
transponation architecture." Toward this charge, the enhancement of systemic safety in aviation 
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is a priority in the research directions undertaken. A review of the several ongoing aviation 
safety research projects at the Aviation Institute are presented and discussed in the interest of 
identifying collaboration opportunities. Integration of collegiate aviation resources in the area of 
safety education and research development wili result in safety enhancements for the overall air 
transportation system. 
Author Bioeraphies 
Dr. Brent Bowen is the University of Nebraska Foundation Distinguished Professor in Aviation. 
He serves as Director for the Aviation Institute and as Director of Aviation and Transportation 
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with privileges in both Alaska and Oklahoma .. FAA Licenses and Ratings include Airline 
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Chien-tsung Lu is a doctoral research assistant at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He 
attained his MS degree in Aviation Safety from Central Missouri State University. He is an FAA 
certified aviation technician and Federal Communication Commission (FCC) licensee. He is 
currently pursuing his Doctorate of Public Administration degree with an area of specialization 
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in Aviation Administration. Mr. Lu's research interests are in the areas of airline maintenance 
safety management, accident investigation and prevention, human behavior and safety, aircraft 
cabin safety and training, and public policy. 
Mrs. Michaela Schaaf is Instructor of Aviation and Senior Research Associate at the UNO 
Aviation Institute. She holds a Master of Science degree, Aviation Concentration, from the 
University ofNebra:ika at Omaha where she is presently working toward a Doctorate in Public 
Administration with an Area of Specialization in Aviation Administration. Mrs. Schaaf is also 
pursing a Certificate in Aviation Safety and Security Management from The George Washington 
University. Her Federal Aviation Administration certificates include Private Pilot and Basic 
Ground Instructor. Additionally, Mrs. Schaaf serves as Assistant Director of the NASA 
Nebraska Space GTant Program. She is a member of Women in Aviation, International; Council 
on Aviation Accreditation; University A viatiot; Association; American Society for Public 
Administration; Omicron Delta Kappa; Alpha Eta Rho; and Civil Air Patrol . Her research 
interests are in the areas of aviation security, curriculum development, program evaluation, and 
women in aviation. 
Dr. David P. Widauf is the Aviation Program Coordinator and Associate Professor of 
Industrial Technology in the College of Engineering at Utah State University. He received his 
Doctorate in Industrial Technology from Texas A&M University, his M.A. in Educational 
Administration from Pepperdine University, and his B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering/Industrial 
Technology from California Polytechnic State University. He is a former Technical Engineering 
Program Manager and Project Engineer forE-Systems Inc. and Squadron Navigator for the U.S. 
Air Force. As a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve, Dr. Widauf serves at Hill AFB. He currently 
is teaching classes in Aviation Science, Aerodynamics, Composite Materials, and Aircraft 
Systems. His research has included developing, manufacturing and successfully testing a 
composite nose cone for the "Bow Shock" project for the Utah State Space Dynamics 
Laboratory. He is a co-principal investigator on a remote sensing research aircraft platform for 
the Rocky Mountain Space Grant Consortium. 
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The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) current Federal Aviation Regulations 
(F ARs) do not explicitly require Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training. 
Whilst the benefits ofMRM training, which originated in human factors researches, have 
been !":':Ognized by the air industry and its mandatory implementation has been regulated 
by many aviation authorities such as those of Canada, United Kingdom, and European 
Union (EU) countries, the FAA in the United States retains its non-regulation stance 
This situation has raised both curiosity and a research anxiety to discover the rationale 
underpinning such decision making. This white paper aims to explore related docum::.nts, 
up-to-date evidence and real-world perspectives in relation to MRM training. 
Consequently, the authors hope to generate research propositions and tentative theories 




Aviation safety issues are always at the forefront of pub I ic concerns. The American 
flying public has appreciated the development of technology in favor of modernizing 
civil air transportation since the passage of Airline Deregulation Act in I 978. After 
deregulation, the government's legislative attempt in enhancing aviation safety and 
revitalizing civil aviation -the public experienced more efficient, comfortable, and 
competent air transportation. However, people have also been continuously demanding a 
safer, accident-free aviation environment. Therefore promoting aviation safety has 
become one of the top priorities for the government and air carriers. Unfortunately, the 
potential for aviation accidents still threatens us. 
Historically, pilot error has contributed the majority of aviation accidents (Boeing, 
2000). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has conducted 
human factors research that aims to cure flight deficiency-pilot errors (Orlady & Orlady, 
1999). Since the early 1970s, NASA human factors researchers have developed the Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) training as response to this. Since then, CRM has been an 
important safety training for pilot, which aims to taper pilot error. As a matter of fact , 
since United Airlines (UA) initially launched its voluntary implementation of Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) in 1981, pilot error-related accidents have been 
reducedl981 (Mudge, 1998; Lu, 2001). NASA' s successful human factors experiments 
and knowledge implementations in airlines have later lead to another important system of 
training- in this case, for AMTs- called maintenance resource management (MRM), 
which came about in late 1980s. 
After UA's successful application ofCRM, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). in 1990, mandated Crew Resource Management (CRM) for all airline pilot 
(Aviation Supplies & Academics [ASA], 200la) in addition to the existing regulations 
regulating pilot qualifications, operations, and activities (i .e., medical standards, night 
rules, standardized operations, and training). The mandatory implementation of CRM by 
regulation aimed to ensure the reduction of pilot errors for the entire air industry (United 
States Government Printing Office [US GPO], 1990). Meanwhile, MRM training also 
attempted to prevent maintenance errors since its birth and the results have been 
positively confirmed by the air industry and FAA itself (Lavitt, 1995). Interestingly, the 
FAA has not attempted to regulate MRM for maintenance personnel, while the public, 
academia, and the FAA itself have considered the MRM training as the vital role in 
promoting maintenance safety. 
A review ofFAA FARs reveals the fact that there is no regulation·mandating any 
safety trainings for AMTs. This situation does not mean that safety trainings for the 
AMTs are not necessary. In fact, it generates policy controversy that needs to be 
discovered for academia researchers. 
.14 
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The FAA has contributed a new Advisory Circular (AC) I 2 I -SOD as a guideline of 
safety training for both pilots and AMTs. Yet, AC 121-SOD mainly illustrates the 
guidelines for pilot CRM and partially mentions the concepts of MRM training (FAA, 
200 I). Even though the FAA has been circulating the AC 120-S I D to the air industry, the 
nature of AC is not mandatory. AC is a document that is in an advice or encouraging 
fashion. However, without a legitimacy platform championing MRM training, the 
airlines' training regularity and willingness are both skeptical (Brackbill, 1994). 
This white paper aims to explore the reasons behind the missing part of the FAA 
FARs in terms ofthe MRM training for AMTs. Why is it rational without regulating 
MRM? Is there any alternative to promote MRM instead of proposing regulations? 
Background 
After the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the nature of laissez-faire 
and free competition has forced airlines to further promote, or at least maintain air safety 
in order to compete with business rivals and survive (Chang, 1986). As Chang ( 1986) 
particularly stated in relation to safety training about Pacific market, the financial 
condition was primarily considered by airlines. For small airlines, the safety training 
could not be ensured without a strong financial support (Rose, 1992). 
Meanwhile, airlines have tried to provide low-airfare products in order to attract 
more passengers and, ultimately, to survive in the Darwinian post-deregulation 
battlefield. Yet, providing both high safety level and low-fare air transportation seems 
paradoxical. Aviation safety researchers have already pinpointed the negative impact 
from deregulation and market competition on overall aviation safety (Kucinski, 1990; De 
Jager, 1993 ). Both Kucinski and De Jager stated that the passage of airl.ine deregulation 
act not only shaped the current business ecology of air transportation in the United States, 
but also led to the substantial reduction of training cost (Brackbill, 1994). In particular, 
the cost of safety training and surveillance was typically dwindled if the airlines 
encountered a constrained operational budget (Kucinski, 1990; De Jager, 1993). They 
further argued the logic of this cost reduction phenomenon by revealing that the airlines 
tend to meet the basic safety requirements regulated by the FAA. In addition to this, it 
was found that by reducing operational cost, the airlines could possibly provide lower 
airfare for passengers, increase load factor, gain more revenue, and therefore survive. The 
Consumer Reports Travel Letter in 1997 outlined that it is highly suspicious that low-cost 
airlines can operate to a uniformly safety standard in the U.S. ( 1997 March) 
The FAA's Dual Mandates- an Ambiguous Schem~ 
The public's concern with aviation safety has forced the government to pass related 
public laws and constantly inspect airline safety performance. The FAA has been in 
charge of air transportation affairs since its birth in 1967 (Rollo, 2000). On the one hand, 
the FAA should foster and encourage civil air commerce. On the other, the FAA also has 
to audit and promote aviation safety performance (Adamski & Doyle, 1995; Rollo, 2000). 
Yet, this "dual-mandate" responsibility has resulted in the FAA's insufficient ability in 
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safety surveillance (Nader & Smith, 1994). Consequently. the FAA's lack of 
effectiveness in safety inspection has been continuously criticized by the public 
(Connelly, 2001) as well as by the government itself(Stout, 1999, Dec. 2; Cannady, 
200l;Filler,2001 July It). 
The Traditional Pilot-oriented Aviation ~.:ru:~ 
According to an annual report from Boeing, "Worldwide Commercial Jet Airplane 
Accidents," in 2000, cockpit crew error was the primary factor causing accidents 
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(Boeing, 2000). Between 1991 and 2000, pilot error had contributed to around 66% of the 
accidents in the entire commercial aviation business. In the same report, the Boeing 
Company indicated that it was worse between 1959 and 2000 (68.3%), which meant pilot 
error remained high when compared with the other causalities. Yet, we must notice that 
more than 5% of commercial aviation accidents resulted from maintenance-related 
problems (Boeing, 2000). Concerning the goal of government's zero-accident proposal, 
5% is too big to be Ignored. MRM training is not yet regulated by the FAA. There are 
more than 5% overall aviation accidents caused by the mistakes of ground maintenance 
personnel (Boeing, 2000). For a persuasive evidence, the following headlined 
maintenance-error related mishaps (See Table 2) can be seen as an urgent warning signal 
to the air industry and government that indicates maintenance safety should be treated as 
significant before similar accidents happen again. 
Table 2 
M-amtenance E rror R I dM' h etate IS 
Date Airlines/ model 
5125179 American Airlines I 
DC-10 




7/19/89 United Airlines I 
DC-10 
01/31/00 Alaska I MD-82 





Yes Engine separation due to 
flawed maintenance 
Yes Improper bulkhead 
maintenance 
Yes Inadequate maintenance of 
aged fuselage 
Yes Improper NDT maintenance 
of #2 engine turbine blades 
Yes Improper maintenance of 
jackscrew 
Under In-flight break-up (parts of 
investigation rudder and engines} 
Resources: Data retneved from the Nattonal Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
Accident and Incident database on-line [Retrieved on Sep. 22, 200 I) and Dr. Shari 












Purposes of Study 
The main goal of this project is twofold. First, locate the significant views of the 
internal and external dynamic variables of human factors influencing aircraft 
maintenance and flight performance. Second, conduct an in-depth analysis and 
comparison in relation to MRM education and seek to yield a detailed understanding of 
current training scenarios and regulations across important aviation countries. 
Despite the development of human factors and MRM education in aircraft 
maintenance field in the 1990s, ironically, many current working AMTs are not well 
educated in MRM, which could ultimately jeopardize aviation safety. Academia cannot 
overemphasize the importance of aviation safety research and should continuously 
explore the ways to strengthen it. Because there is no regulation of MRM, this white 
paper will primarily seek to discover the rationale behind this decision, fulfill the 
knowledge deficit for the purpose of promoting aviation maintenance and airline safety, 
and overarch the regulatory gap if possible. 
Review of Literat11res 
6 
After the fatal accident of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 in January 2000, caused by a 
flawed jackscrew maintenance and rushed inspection (Fiorino, 2001 ), many aviation 
experts have been boldly informed that the zero-accident cannot be achieved by focusing 
on flight safety only . The maintenance safety also plays a significant role in supporting 
aviation safety. The tasks of preventing flawed aircraft maintenance could not be 
overemphasized as well. 
Jdentifying the Human Factors Affecting Maintenance Performance 
Commercial airplanes are recognized as some of the most inspected and maintained 
transportation equipment in the world. The main purpose of aircraft maintenance is to 
keep aircraft remaining airworthy (King, 1986). The major components of an airplane, 
such as flaps, ailerons, rudder, engines, landing gears, and fuselage are inspected closely 
by aircraft technicians following standardized operation proc.edures (SOPs). Normally, 
airlines or fixed base operators (FBOs) produce their own standardized maintenance 
manuals approved by the FAA based on the original maintenance manuals provided by 
the manufacturers (Richardson, Rodwell, & Baty, 1995). Whether an aircraft is airworthy 
or should be retained for further detailed inspections is recommended by qualified 
maintenance personnel- the FAA certified AMTs (Delp, Watkins, & Kroes, 1994). 
Typically, airline maintenance tasks arc initially categorized into four routine 
checks, from A-check to D-check, as well as timed on an hourly to annual basis (King, 
1986). Often, aircraft mechanics must remove access panels to closely and accurately 
inspect critical components, such as the electrical wiring, hydraulic system, cables, and 
look for severe corrosion in remote areas. In particular, when conducting a D-check 
1.7 
7 
inspection - a detailed inspection and replacement of thousands of critical parts (such as 
engine bearings, engine blades, and o-rings)- must be accomplished in order to restore 
the compatible strength and usability of an aircraft (Butterworth-Hayes, 1997). Most 
importantly from the airline management perspective, each stage of aircraft maintenance 
should be efficiently and effectively completed for the shortest "on-the-ground" time and 
the highest amount of possible revenue-generating services. 
Aircraft maintenance is quite challenging and intense. Therefore, human factors 
affecting job performance should be scrutinized. A survey conducted by Boeing 
Company and other safety researchers revealed the elements mainly contributing to AMT 
mistakes as the following: 1) boredom; 2) failure to understand instructions well; 3) 
rushing; 4) pressure from management; 5) fatigue; 6) distractions at critical time; 7) shift 
work; 8) poor communication; 9) use of incorrect parts and tools; and I 0) unauthorized 
maintenance proceedings (Al-Aimoudi, 1998; Taylor & Christensen, 1998). Wood ( 1997) 
and Drury (1999 & 2001) further argued the major problems of AMTs when conducting 
aircraft maintenance/inspection (See Table 3}, and asserted that AMTs make mistakes 
and they are not error-free per se. 
Table 3 
~ical Aircraft Maintenance Jnsoection Problems --· 
I. Fatigue and error- Awkward postures due to restricted spaces and unsuitable support 
stands leading to postural fatigue and errors. 
2. Physical Impediment - Heavy and awkward lifting and movement of components, 
particularly around structural obstructions. This leads to component and structural 
damage, as well as to soft tissue injuries. 
3. Biomechanics - Controls on access equipment, such as cherry pickers, which do not 
follow good human factors practice. Such poor control design often results in contact 
between the equipment and the aircraft structure. 
4. Foreign Object Damage- Lack of tool counting and check-off procedures allowing for 
the potential of leaving tools inside structures when work is complete_ 
5. Ignorance- Lack of conspicuous visual indicators of correct closure leading to failure 
to close access hatches completely after maintenance. 
6. Misconduction- Adopting incorrect instructions/tools or insufficient instructions/tools 
that leads to unairworthy_ condition and consequently costs more to restore. 
7. Overlook- Failure to target critical/remote parts, equipments, or corrosion that 
requires replacement and repair. 
Resources: R1chard Wood (1997), AvwtiOfl sa(etyprograms. Cohoe G. Drury (200 I, 
October 2), "Establishing a Human Factors/Ergonomics program" and Human factor.'l in 
aviation maintenance ( J 999). 
Without a doubt, because of its task complexity, physical and mental requirements 
(i.e., personal awareness, stress, situation habituation, rest, fatigue, and health), and tense 
working climate (i.e., shift work, managerial pressure, working efficiency, interpersonal 
communication, and external sociological influences), the maintenance issues contrasted 
with so-called human factors aspects are highly identical to those that affect flight 
performance. In particular, we should pay more attention to social and psychological 
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problems, because, although they cannot be easily sensed or visualized, they are 
influencing AMTs' decision making on a daily basis (Courchaine & Loucka, 1995; 
Hoffman, Granhag, Kwong, Sheree, & Loftus, 2001 April). The AMTs' working 
situation should be examined closely when considering the relationship between their 
health and job performance. In addition, the FAA does not require an AMT to hold an 
official medical certificate as like pilots. Apart from the routine medical test for alcohol 
and drug abuse regulated by the FAR Part 65.12 and 65.23 (ASA, 200Jb), there is no 
required federal medical certificate for AMTs. 
The Advantage of Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) 
8 
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training has been considered to be one 
of the cures for maintenance errors (Lavitt, 1995; Mudge, 1998). MRM was initially 
developed based on the experimental findings of human factors knowledge observed by 
NASA in the early 1970s. Human factors is a study concerning the interaction between 
human and software (S), hardware (H), environment (E), and liveware (L), which is so-
called the "SHEL" model in aviation safety (see Table 4) (Krause, 1996). The interfaces 
between active elements (S.H.E.L.) and human beings constitute the framework of 
interactions and working performance. 
Table4 
- "SHEL" Model 
Human Performance 
Environment 
Resources: Krause, S. S. (1996): "A ireraft safety- accident investigation.'i, ana/y.w!s, & 
application.'i" and Federal Aviation Administration. (2000, December 30): "Sy.\·tem .w~fety 
handbook: practices and guidelines for conducting system safety engineering and 
management". 
Likewise, human factors is an analytical science of the factors influencing human 
performance and consequently seeks to eliminate or dilute the negative impact from an 
explicit safety factor (Orlady & Orlady, 1999). Furthermore, human factors is scientific 
research regarding human-centered activities. Nonnally, it is the science of exploring 
human-centered activities that includes the research of human's inner and outer 
capabilities and limitations, and the adaptation to the change of environment (Koonce, 
1999; Orlady & Orlady, 1999). Because the human factors concepts are underpinning the 
MR.M training, the primary purpose of launching MRM training for the AMTs is to 
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restore an AMT's performing compatibility, self-awareness, interpersonal 
communication, and effectiveness of resource usage. 
9 
Docs safety training (CRM and MRM) help? Capitelli (1988) conducted 
longitudinal research across three major airlines regarding the relationship between the 
duration of airline maintenance safety training and the maintenance related violations. He 
discovered that the less training received by airline maintenance technicians, the more 
violations filed against maintenance could occur. ln the contemporary aircraft 
maintenance field, MRM training primarily seeks to reduce maintenance flaws and 
aviation accidents by heightening the level of self-awareness and interpersonal 
communication. In other words, MRM training has gained its deserved currency from the 
air industry (Lavitt, 1995). 
Advisory Circular (AC) 120-51 
Certainly, the FAA had contributed significant effort to the development of 
maintenance resource management rooted in the research playground of human factors. 
In order to propose a framework ofMRM training for the air industry, the FAA issued 
Advisory Circular (A C) 120-5 J A in 1992 (FAA, 1992), 120-51 B in 1997 (FAA, 1997), 
J 20-51 C in 1998 (FAA, 1998), and 120-51 D in 200 I (FAA, 2001) to cope with human 
factors such as situational awareness, leadership, communication skills, teamwork, and 
decision making that directly affected aviators. The FAA's suggested training curriculum 
topics in AC 120-5 JD involve two major sectors: (a) communications process and 
decision behavior; and (b) team building and maintenance. The first sector contains 
. suggested trainings in open communication, conflict resolution, situational awareness, 
evaluation, and recognition, and group decision making. The second recommended sector 
includes the trainings of leadership and followership, interpersonal dynamics, 
management climate, workload management, preparation and vigilance, distraction 
avoidance, and stress reduction (FAA, 2001 May). The federal regulations in light of the 
implementation of the newly issued AC 120-51 D are listed in FAR Part 121 and Part 13 5 
for all flight crews, dispatchers and flight attendants. As stated in FAR Part 121-419(b ), 
initial ground training must contain the following programmed hours of safety 
instruction: I) Group J airplanes- reciprocating powered (64 hours) and turbopropeller 
powered (80 hours), and 2) Group II airplanes (120 hours) oftraining for pilots and flight 
engineers. The regulated hours of human factors training for flight attendants are from 
four (4) to twenty hours while the DRM training hours for dispatchers are from 30 to 40, 
which depends on the category of air service (ASA, 2001a). 
Joint Aviation Regulation (JAR) and Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR) 
As stated by the JAA in 2001, "the FAA has decided to focus on research, 
publication of guidance material and the promotion of Human Factors Programmes 
without changing the regulatory framework" (JAA, 2001, p.5). In other words, the FAA 
does not attempt to regulate MRM at the present time. In Europe, the Joint Aviation 
Authority (JAA) has regulated such safety training for aircraft technicians since June I, 
1998. Addressed in the JAR Part 66, an aircraft engineering candidate should be tested 
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regarding the knowledge of maintenance human factors and a detailed or itemized 
examination should be otherwise discussed. The knowledge requirement of maintenance 
human factors is to enhance a technician's situation awareness, mental consciousness, 
interpersonal communication, and ongoing self-evaluation (JAA, 2001). In Canada, the 
Transportation Canadian, the aviation authority in Canada, has also regulated the similar 
safety training in Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR) Part V, "Airworthiness Manual 
Chapter 566-13," since August 1998 (Transport Canada, 2001, December 12). As 
outlined in this chapter, an aircraft maintenance candidate should be able to apply 
occupational health and safety practices and explain how human factors contribute to 
maintenance errors (Transport Canada, 200 I, December 12). The regulatory requirement 
issued by the JAA and Transport Canada has forced the maintenance training schools 
within the European Union (EU) and Canadian territories to embed human factors 
training for student aircraft technicians. 
The FAA's fundamental training requirement for an AMT listed in FAR Part 
147.21 is 1,900 hours (400 hours general, 750 hours airframe, and 750 powerplant) 
(United States Government Printing Office [US GPO], 2001, November 18). Each 
training section is basically divided into three subsections for a total of nine (9)' 
subsections. The aircraft knowledge and practice skills portion of technician training 
should contain general, airframe, and powerplant sections oftraining listed in FAR Part 
147 Appendix B, C, and D. Table 6 illustrates a typical training curriculum for the FAA 
Part 147 technician school. 
Table 6 
Th T . I Ai e .vntca rcra ftT h .. T .. Sllb t u . d s ec nictan rammg ;yJ a us m t 1e mte tetes 
General Basic electricity, aircraft drawing, weight and balance, tubing and fitting, 
Training ground eperation, material and process, mathematics, physiGs, corrosion 
control, form and record, maintenance publications, and mechanic 
privileges and limitations. 
Airframe Wood structure, aircraft covering and finishing, sheet metal and non-
Training metallic structure, welding, assembly and rigging, airframe inspection, 
landing system. hydraulic and pneumatic system, cabin atmosphere control, 
aircraft instrument system, navigation and radio communication, i'tlel 
system, electrical system, position warning system, ice and rain control, 
and fire protection system. 
Powerplant Powerplant theory and maintenance, reciprocating engine, turbine engines, 
Training engine inspection, engine instrument system, engine fire protection system, 
engine electrical system, lubrication system, ignition and staring system, 
fuel metering system, engine fueling system, induction ad airflow sy.;tern, 
engine cooling system, exhaust and reverser system, propellers, unducted 
fans, and auxiliary _!)_Ower unit. 
Resource: FAA FAR Partl47 Appendtx B. C and D. 
Without a douot, there is no regulation ofMRM training, human factors, or related safety 




However, in Europe, after June I, 1998, in addition to the avionic training and 
understanding of legislation, the new revised training modular syllabus ofthe JAA's JAR 
Pan 66, "knowledge requirements," has enforced the maintenance human factors to be 
tested (Federal Office for Civil Aviation [FOCA], 2001 May). Swiss FOCA reflected this 
policy change and categorized the training syllabus for this aircraft maintenance license 
(AML) into 17 training modules (see Table 7): 
Table 7 
JAR-66 AML Training Modules 
Module I Mathematics Module 10 Aviation 1eBislation 
Module2 Physics Module 11 Aeroplane systems (Mechanical) 
Module 3 Electrical fundamentals Module 12 Helicopter systems (Mechanical) 
Module 4 Electronic fundamentals Module 13 Aircraft systems (Avionic) 
Module 5 Digital techniques Module 14 Prol'_ulsion (Avionic) 
Module 6 Material & hardware Module 15 Turbine engine 
Module 7 Maintenance practices Module 16 Piston engine 
Module 8 Basic aerodynamics Module 17 Propellers 
Module9 Human factors Module 18 Reserved 
Resource: Swiss Federal Office for Cwil Aviation [FOCA]. (2001 May), Conversion of a 
Swiss Licence to a restricted or full JAR-66 aircraft maintenance licence (AML). 
The cross-reference between JAR and FAR implies that the insertion ofMRM or 
human factors education to the existing training program seems reasonable. However, 
from Maddox's angle, both current minimum duration of overall AMT training ( 1900 
hours) and tuition would be increased. Will it erode one's willingness to become an 
aircraft technician? The shortage of AMTs in aviation industry has been a serious 
problem and the shortage keeps expanding (Phillips & Taverna, 2001). This situation is 
not only negatively affecting maintenance operations, but will literally slash the quality 
of maintenance. 
The Relationship Between Regulation and Safety 
Mudge (1998) argued that without a solid law regulating specific human operation 
in relation to the MRM in aircraft maintenance, the decision making of human beings 
will be by no means flawless. Especially, he argued that personal capability of making 
correct decision will be shrunken when one is immersed in a highly stressful environment 
or under heavy workload. He further argued that in aviation safety training, without 
regulations, human reactions to any ongoing abnormal situations in lieu of a standardized 
procedure will tend to revert back to the original skills because they feel more 
comfort?.ble to apply. In other words, AMTs will act just as they would have prior to any 
safety training. It is called the law of primary in psychology (Mudge, 1998). As the FAA 
itselfreported in AC 120-SlD 7e, "when there is no effective reinforcement .. . by way of 
recurrent training, improvements in attitudes observed after initial indoctrination tent to 
disappear, and individuals' attitudes tend to revert to former levels" (FAA, 2001 ). The 
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safety training will be in vain provided there is no official regulation associated with it 
for the obligatory recurrent safety trainings. 
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The study ofLofaro and Smith (1998) in this area stated that the FAA's regulations 
are only the minimum standards for flight operation and maintenance performance. 
Although the airlines always commit to exceed the marginal criteria for the sake of 
passenger safety and company reputation, maintaining the above-standard safety 
performance can only happen when an air carrier's finance is healthy (Lofaro and Smith, 
1998). They argued that "when any air carrier is in financial trouble" or wants to 
maximize its profit, "there are only a few ways open to cut costs: reduce the quality and 
training ofboth flight crew and mechanics, reduce the quality of the maintenance and 
outsource all you can" (Lofaro and Smith, 1998, p.213). If the airlines seek to cut training 
costs, they will cut the items related to maintenance people such as MRM. It is legal not 
to conduct MRM training for AMTs. Yet it violates the federal regulation provided the 
regulated CRM for the flight crews is absent. Even though the airlines are in a stable 
financial condition, based on the regulation, they are legally allowed not to spend 
resources in MRM training and still meet the FAA safety requirements. 
Because the F ARs do not contain an explicit regulation of human factors or related 
training for AMTs, many non-profit organizations, such as the Air Transport Association 
(AT A) and Natiomll Air Transportation Association (NAT A) have called for an initial 
revision of AMT licensing procedures (Maddox, 2001). 
Research Propositions 
Executive Order 12866 and 13132 were issued to direct federal agencies to assess 
economic impact and cost analysis on state and local government. The Regulatory 
Flexibility Act of 1980 was passed to reinforce stakeholders collecting public voice 
before proposing a policy or regulation (Filler, 2001 July 11). However, regardless ofthe 
mandated guidelines of the Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13132, and the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, FAA's operation is also pulled by various 
administrative actors such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), segmented 
federal cabinets, and industry lobbyists (Filler, 2001 July 11). The administrator's role 
should be that of a facilitator who politically integrates "administrative conservatorship" 
in an organization as Terry (1995, p. XX) depicted. Administrators should retain a role of 
conservator, who should filter and control the external influence upon organizations 
(Terry, 1995). In addition, the function of a public administrator should remain in 
"balance wheel" fashion as argued by Rohr ( 1986, p. 182) - people who pamper 
legislative power, judicial surveillance and public needs (Rohr, 1986). 
It is understandable that public agencies have been placed in the center of the 
political vortex. Hence, decision making is never simple or linear within this iron-
triangle. It is a battlefield; plural-value competitions are underway. The merits of 
arguments should thus contain the following multi-dimensional research aspects: What's 
the rationale not to regulate MRM by the government? What is the nature of the FAA's 
policy making? What human factors affect AMT performance? What is the airlines' 
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attitude in conducting non-regulatory MRM training? Should we need to regulate MRM? 
Are there any alternatives for MRM? Do we need to revise the initial technician training 
syllabus? If so, can we revise the technician training syllabus without adding more 
training hours? If the answer is no, what is the current AMT's reaction to an obligatory 
MRM? Is it costly to conduct MRM training? What is the true relationship between 
MRM training and safety performance? 
Conclusion 
While the global aviation industry works closely to strike for a zero-accident 
operational climate by recruiting MRtvf or related training as an initial safety training for 
aircraft technicians, the FAA's reluctance in relation to the attempt of regulating MRM is 
a researchable case. Theoretically, on the one hand, ifMRM shows no importance to 
aircraft technicians in the U.S ., the FAA does not have to revise it for and recommend it 
to aviation world. On the other, without a regulatory foundation, the airlines are allowed 
not to implement MRM in order to reduce operational cost. The competing value between 
promoting safety level and reducing expenses remains sound. The rationale behind the 
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Disaster Prepare(lne.~.f. E'mergencv Re~pnn.,·e, and Curriculum Developme111 
Overview 
A new upper-level aviation course at the University of Nebraska at Omaha resulted from 
the application of research in the area of safety, disaster preparedness, and emergency response. 
The course, Airport Safety and Security, was conceived following the crash of TWA 800 and the 
subsequent White House Commission and the growing awareness of emergency planning and 
disaster response in aviation. The course was developed utilizing research into curriculum needs 
in this area, including discussions with industry and government experts. The results of this 
research revealed components for inclusion, such as airport and ramp safety, OSHA requirements, 
risk assessment and management, disaster preparedness, emergency response plans, coordination 
among authorities, crisis communication, and passenger rights. The research also revealed that 
the structure of such a course lends itself to a seminar format and required many areas of 
expertise. The result is a comprehensive curriculum design which provides a model for ready 
implementation in collegiate aviation education programs. 
Introduction 
Curriculum development can be achieved through the application of the research model. 
A new upper-level aviation course at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) followed such 
a plan. The course, Airport Safety and Security, was conceived following the crash of TWA 800 
and the subsequent White House Commission, as well as the growing awareness of emergency 
planning and disaster response in aviation. The course was developed utilizing research into the 
curriculum needs in this area, including discussions with industry and government experts. The 
no 
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results of this research revealed components for inclusion, such as airport and ramp safety, OSHA 
requirements, risk assessment and management, disaster preparedness, emergency response plans, 
coordination among authorities, crisis communication, and passenger rights. The research also 
revealed that the structure of such a course lends itself to a seminar format and required many 
areas of expertise. 
The course which was developed is described in detail in this white paper. This course, 
Airport Safety and Security, is offered at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) as Aviation 
4086/8086. The seminar format is well-suited to graduate students as well as undergraduate 
students. 
Course Description 
This course was designed to allow the students to explore the role of airports in relation to 
safety and security. Topics of the course include regulations, responsibilities, security issues, 
ramp safety, disaster preparedness, and emergency management. The course is intended for all 
students interested in aviation, however the prerequisites for this course specifY junior standing 
and completion of the aviation introductory course. Due to the availability of government 
documents on-line, students are required to have access to and a working knowledge of the 
World Wide Web. 
Important to a course on aviation security, it is made explicitly clear to students that under 
no circumstance are students to attempt infiltration of aviation security, as this is a violation of 
federal law. 
Content and Organization 
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The introduction to this course will include the course objectives and overview, concepts, 
and terms. The importance of airport safety and security in the aviation industry will be 
discussed, as well as the uniqueness of aviation compared to other industries. 
The topic of airport security will involve the study of security regulations for the U.S. and 
international community. Government, airports and airlines security responsibilities will be 
covered, along with physical security equipment requirements. Historical perspectives and the 
future outlook of terrorism in aviation will be studied. Recent security issues such as disruptive 
passengers, baggage match, passenger profiles, certification of security companies, and 
background checks will be explored. The section on dangerous goods will include explosives. 
bomb detection equipment, K-9 units, and hazardous materials. Aviation law enforcement and 
internal security for the airlines will be explored in terms of prevention strategies. 
Airport Safety will include ramp safety, OSHA, risk assessment and management. 
Disaster preparedness will accommodate aviation emergency management; emergency 
response plans; coordination among government, airports, airlines, and non-profit authorities; 
crisis communication; and passenger rights, which will entail the Red Cross and the NTSB Family 
Assistance Act. 
Objectives 
The course objectives were established for students based upon the practical applications 
of the course material. Upon completion of the course, the student should be able to: 
Differentiate between airport and airline responsibilities in safety and security. 
• Outline and explain the appropriate regulations governing airport safety and 
security. 
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Trace the evolution of aviation security in terms of the unique threat to aviation. 
Evaluate appropriate methods for securing airports. 
• Develop a safety plan for an airline station at an airport . 
Methodology 
Develop an emergency response plan for an airport including federal requirements. 
Identify the essential organizations available to respond to airport emergencies. 
Students will learn course material through various means. First, the written 
communication component will incorporate a final essay exam and other written assignments. 
The oral communication component includes in-class presentations, group exercises, and class 
participation. The computer and technology component includes word processing, e-mail, web 
assignments, library database searching, and education technology presentations to the class. 
Since all assignments must be typed, students are encouraged to use the UNO computer labs for 
computer applications. The international component includes aviation security issues which affect 
U.S. airlines overseas. The research component consists of the course project or paper. 
Additionally, various teaching methodologies will be used in administering the course. 
The course will be delivered through in-class lectures, guided discussions, on-line demonstrations, 
guest speakers, and media-oriented presentations. The instructor will stimulate thinking, provide 
enthusiasm, be responsive to students, be well prepared for class, and explain and clarifY subject 
material. The instructor will grade fairly, clarify subject material, and be available to students for 
office hours. 
Evaluation 
As the class is offered to both graduates and undergraduates, differing evaluation 
mechanisms were established. The undergraduate final exam will consist of essay and short 
answer questions which will be comprehensive in nature. Undergraduate students will prepare 
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three article critiques over the assigned articles. Each critique will be I 'h - 2 double-spaced typed 
pages. The critiques will require students to analyze information in the article, not summarize it. 
They will be evaluated on their ability to incorporate other course materials in the analysis to 
strengthen the critiques. Students will present the critiques to the class and lead a discussion. 
The final course grade for undergraduate students will be based on the following point scale: 
Undergraduate Final Exam 







The graduate final essay exam will be comprehensive in nature. It will cover all course 
material, including graduate reading for the course paper. Graduate students will prepare a 
research paper on a topic selected from the content outline in this syllabus. Students will utilize a 
research methodology, such as content analysis, to conduct the research study. In the instance 
that a student works in the field, students may instead negotiate a project related to their job and 
the course material to be approved by the course instructor. The final course grade for graduate 
students will be based on the following point scale: 
Graduate Final Comprehensive Essay Exam 400 
Course Paper/Project 300 
Participation I 00 
Total Points 800 
Class participation is required of alJ students and may consist of announced or 
unannounced quizzes, attendance, participation in class discussions and exercises, or any 
combination of these. A subjective evaluation by the instructor is the primary criterion of in-class 
performance. 
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Resource Material 
Given the nature of the course material, many of the assigned readings are from 
government-produced documents. Readings will be assigned from the following: 
FAA Advisory Circular 150/5200-18B Airport Safety Self-Inspection 
FAA Advisory Circular 150/5200-3 I A Airport Emergency Plan 
National Transportation Safety Board. ( 1999). Federal family assistance plan for 
aviatio11 disasters. Washington, DC: Author. 
http://www .ntsb.g.ov/publictn/2000/spcOOO l .htm 
• Federal Aviation Regulation Parts 107, 108, 109, 139, 191 
http://www faa ~ov/avr/AFS/F ARS/tar-1 07. txt 
http ://www faa . ~ov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/tar-1 08.1:\:t 
http://www. taa g.ov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-1 09txt 
http://www . faa . ~ov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-139 txt 
http://www . faa . ~ov/avr/AFS/F ARS/far-1 9 I . txt 
• Additional articles will be available in the library on reserve. 
The UNO campus offers many services for students. These organizations and offices 
provide students with additional resources to complete course requirements. 
• The UNO Library. Research resources including Genisys and other services. A 
UNO Library guide is available specifically for locating aviation sources in the 
library. Website: http://library.unomaha .edu/ 
• The UNO Computer Labs. Computer and Data Communication Labs are 
located throughout the UNO campus with variable hours for student convenience. 
Call or visit the Help Desk at 554-DATA. located in EAB 005, for times and 
locations of campus computer labs. 
• The UNO Learning Center. Provides instruction and services to assist students 
in the development of skill s necessary for efl'ective academic performance and 
positive adjustment to the college learning environment. Specifically provides 
tutorial services. Website:hu p.//www.unomaha cdu/- wwwlc/ 
• The UNO Career and Placement Office. Information on job openings and other 
information for UNO students and alumni. 
A current bibliography of resources for further information was established for graduate 
students preparing course papers and projects, as well as for undergraduate students seeking 
additional resources. Below is a selected website bibliography from the course handout. 
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Web Sites: 
FAA Civil Aviation Security 
http://cas.faa.gov 
Federal Aviation Regulation Parts 107, 108, 109, 139, 191 
http://www. faa.gov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-1 07. txt 
http://www.faa.gov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-1 08.txt 
http://www.faa.gov/avr/ AFS/F ARS/far-1 09.txt 
http://www.faa.gov/avr/AFS/FARS/far-139.txt 
http://www.faa.gov/avr/AFS/F ARS/far-191.txt 
Gore Commission Final Report to President Clinton 
http :1 lwww .securitymanagement .com/goreover. html 
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide 
http://cid.unomaha.edu/-jatww 
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/whcoasas.htm 
Concluding Curriculum Design Components 
Schaaf & Bowen 8 
Many suggested reading materials would supplement the student's required reading and 
provide graduate students with informational resources for their course paper or project. Some of 
the areas in which suggested readings are provided include aviation security regulations. aerial 
piracy, aviation hijackings, aerial sabotage, aviation terrorism, passenger profiling, bombs and 
bombings, air rage, sky crimes, airport safety self-inspection, airport emergency plans, 
occupational safety and health management, safety management, organizational learning from 
accidents, aviation security from an integrated system approach. crisis management, airline 
passenger screening, explosive detection systems, family assistance plan, international aviation 
security, crisis communication, baggage reconciliation, and security training. 
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Mrs. Mary Fink is the Coordinator of research and special Programs for the 
Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. She holds Master's and 
Bachelor's degrees in Aviation Administration for the University of Nebraska at Omaha. 
In addition to administering NASA-funded research programs in excess of $5 million, 
Mrs. Fink is also an instructor for the Aviation Institute. She is a Federal Aviation 
Administration licensed pilot and is a member of the American Society for Public 
Administration; Women in Aviation, International; the Omaha-area 99s; Alpha Eta Rho, 
International Aviation Fraternity; and Omicron Delta Kappa Leadership Society. Her 
research interests lie in the areas of transportation policy and intermodal systems. 
Dr. Michael K. Larson is a professional aerospace educator and pilot with over 
30 years experience and 14,000 hours of pilot time, including service with Pan 
American World Airways. He holds a Master of Science Degree and Doctorate in 
Aerospace Education from Oklahoma State University. Dr. Larson was an FAA Aviation 
Safety Counselor and Designated Examiner with privileges in both Alaska and 
Oklahoma. FAA Licenses and Ratings include Airline Transport Pilot Airplane Single 
and Multi-engine Land and Airplane Single Engine Sea Certified Flight Instructor. (Gold 
Seai/ASEUASES/AMEUinstrument), Flight Engineer (Turbpjet Powered), and FAA 
Safety Counselor. His research interests include GPS systems within the National 
Airspace System framework, safety research on in-flight severe weather encounters, 
and policy research to update federal air regulations for modern pc-based simulation in 
pilot training as well as technological innovation in the National Airspace System. 
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Abstract 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute's commitment to the provision 
of a sati! learning environment both in the classroom and in the air has led to the creation and 
adoption of an Emergency Response Checklist to be utilized in the event that a tlight student is 
involved in an aircraft accident or incident. The plan came to fruition as the result of best 
practices research which examined crisis management plans at several regional flight training 
providers. Four Midwestern universities with aviation programs and one Air Force flying club 
were polled regarding current crisis procedures. At ttie time of the initial study, only one of the 
flight training providers possessed a crisis response plan. This plan outlines the roles of the flight 
vendor, as well as those of University of Nebraska at Omaha Campus Security, Student Affairs, 
University Relations, and the Aviation Institute. The goal of this plan is to eliminate uncertainty 
and assure that emergencies arc responded to in an efficient manner with a clear and open flow of 
communication among all designated channels. As a result of this study, the Aviation Institute 
has implemented its own Emergency Response Checklist with all applicable university channels 
and contracted flight vendors. The outline of the checklist will be provided for review, comment 
and potential adoption by collegiate aviation flight training programs. 
Introduction 
Preparedness is crucial for proper response to crises. "An organization in crisis must be 
visible, show concern. and compassion, and demonstrate efforts to correct the problem to ensure 
similar tragedies do not occur" (Ray, 1999, p. 95). This advice, provided in Strategic 
~ornmunication in Crisis Management : Lessons Learned from the Airli ne Ind ustry. is applicable 
not solely to the airlines. but to all facets of aviation, including the flight student training 
environment. A plan must be instated to combat crises should the situation arise that a student is 
involved in an accident or incident. Crises are characterized by "surprise, threat , insuflicient 
information, time pressures, a lack of control, stress and anxiety, and relational changes and 
tensions among participants" (p. 96). Implementation of a crisis management plan allows the 
focus to be placed on the situation at hand. 
According to Rebecca Luttc, Aviation Safety and Human Factors Instructor at the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UN0!\1), "It's a question of when, which 
type, and how a crisis will occur. You can't wait" (personal communication, July 27, 1999). In 
the event of an emergency situation, abstruseness must be avoided . Ray states, "As the level of 
uncertainty decreases, decision makers are in a stronger position to identify fitting responses" 
( 1999, p. 97). By raising the level of control an organization has over the situation, internal and 
l~xtcrnal conflicts arc minimized . 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute's Emergency Response 
Checklist involves the interaction and cooperation of various companies and departments . 
According to Ray: 
Various parties who are basically unfamiliar with one another must learn to adapt and 
relate . Different goals, perspectives, interests, and responses make thi s a challenge and it 
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is most likely easier said than done. When groups involved act independently and fail to 
integrate their action plans. conflict is likely to occur. ( 1999, p. I 00) 
Therefore, all parties involved in gathering information and notification procedures arc provided 
a detailed document outlining the exact responsibilities and expectations of each company or 
department. 
The UNO Aviation Institute's Student Handbook declares that one ofthe clements of the 
UNOAI is to provide "a comprehensive flight training program" (p. 3). By creating the 
Emergency Response Checklist, the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute 
demonstrates its desire to have a positive organizational culture . According to Ray, "There is a 
reciprocal relationship between organizational culture and communication. An organization's 
culture is created through communication. Communication, in turn, is influenced by an 
organization's culture" ( 1999, p. 39). The UN OJ\1 has carefully selected its flight vendors and 
requires that all shore UNOtd's commi tment to safety . 
Gary Brown. Di rector of Disaster Services for Woodbury County, Iowa, including Sioux 
ity C1atcway Airport, emphasized the need for a crisis plan. Brown advises that, in the event of 
any emergency, one should: "Think about every decision you're making .. . Keep track of all 
times ami have a scribe" report all events (personal communication, July 29, 1999). Brown also 
emphasized the benefits of management research : "We learned from a lot of other people's 
disasters." A crisis plan is "not only a tool which enables the organization to manage the crisis, 
but .. . it further communicates a general mood a111d set of actions by management" (Ray, 1999, 
p. 44). 
According to Chris White, Vice President of Safety and Regulatory Compliance for 
Midwest Express and Skyway Airlines, following an accident or incident it is crucial "to provide 
an environment where survivors, survivors' families, and victims ' families have the bcst 
opportunity to begin the healing process" (personal communication, July 29, 1999). The same 
goals and commitment may be mirrored at the university level or in the flight training 
environment. 
Method 
The authors conducted best practices research to examine crisis management plans at 
several regional flight training providers. Four Midwestern universities with aviation programs 
and one local flight club were contacted by either phone, e-mail or both methods by the author. 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater; Southeast Oklahoma, Durant ; Central Missouri State 
University, Warrensburg; and the Offutt Aero Club, Bellevue stated that currently no written 
emergency plan is on record. 
The University of North Dakota, School of Aerospace was the only program to uave a 
detailed crisis management plan available. Deemed a "pre-accident plan," the handbook stresses 
commitment to safety: "It is the first duty of administration, management, faculty, supervisors, 
instructors, maintenance, line personnel, and all others to provide for safety in operations under 
thl~ir control!" ( 1998, cover). 
Realizing the need for contingency and pre-crisis planning and the lack of such plans 
currently available, the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute developed a plan 
based upon feedback and recommendations from members of the industry and those involved in 
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aircmfl accid~nt investigution. This scheme is intended In prepare all parties involved if a 
University of' Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute llight student is involved in an al~cidcnt or 
incident. 
Resulting Plan 
The University c~(Nebraska at Omaha Aviation lnstitut<' /;light 7i·aining Fmergc•m:v 
Response Checklist: Fundamental Pre-Crisis Planning is a plan intended for implementation at 
all three designated UNOAI flight vendors: Hangar One, Inc ., Millard Airport; the OITutt Aero 
Club, Offutt Air Force Base; and TAC Air, Omaha Fppley Airfield . The tJNO A vial ion lnstitull' 
will also involve the following departments at the University : Campus Senarity, llniversity 
Relations, Student Services, the Department of Public Administration, and till' ('ollegt• of Public 
Affairs and Community Service. 
According to Larry Craig, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Standards 
District Office Safety Program Manager, it is essential that all flight students file u flight plan. 
Information therein will reveal the color and tail number of the downed aircraft as well as the 
name and telephone number of the aircraft home base. 
As soon as there is the first indication of an aircraft accident or incident, the Fedl~ral 
Aviation Administration must be contacted. A call to Flight Service will result in the direct 
notification of the on-call Federal Aviation Administration orticial. According to a telephone 
conversation with Mr. Craig ( 1999, July 14), "Once we (the investigators) arc on-site, you 
(UNO AI and its affiliates) arc out of the picture. It is no longer your aircraft . As details unfold, 
we will notify next of kin." Craig added that flight vendors and/or the university may provide 
assistance in locating contact information for a victim's next of kin . 
Emergency management, fire departments, and law enforcement oflkers arc advised to 
follow a plan of action developed by the Flight Standards District Office . These agencies arc 
advised to "not disturb or move the wreckage except to the !extent! necessary : to remove persons 
injured or trapped; to protect the wreckage from further damage; or to protect the public from 
injury" (Nebraska FSDO, 1999, p. I). 
Photographs of the scene must be taken, a wreckage diagram must he constructed, and the 
wreckage site must be preserved and secured until the aircraft is released to the National 
Transportation Safety Board/Federal Aviation Administration. liNOAI llight vendors may assist 
local authorities in this process. Additionally, the FSDO report advises on commenting ltl the 
media: "Treat the press as you would at any accident site. Advise them that lcdcral investigators 
arc on the way and further information may be obtained from them" (p. 2). 
Together, the flight vendor must work with all authorities and related parties to ensure 
that the rt:sponsc and subsequent investigation is handled properly. The following checklist 
includes FAA/NTSB procedures which arc utilized at the University of North Dakota ( ll)9H, p. 
9) and may be emulated, in part, within the lJNOAI 1-:mcrgent~y Response Checklist : 
I. Site description 
2. Photographs 
3. {t1dividual) flight records reviewed 
4 . Aircraft maintemnct: records 
5. Accident/Incident/Occurrence checklist complete 
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6. Individual drug tl'St n.:sults 
7. Interview cycwitncss(cs) 
It Interview person(s) involved in mishap 
9. NTSB/FAA reports suhmittcd 
I 0. In-house Report completed 
II. Insurance Report suhmitted 
Meanwhile, the local night vendor will contact the FAA, lJNO Aviation lnstitutl\ and 
UNO Campus Security. Mr. Kosel or Mr. Mmton will he notified immediately. l ~ ithcr Mr. Kosel 
or Mr. Murton will then contact University Relations and Student Services, as required hy 
Section 2.2. of the UNO I landhook. Campus Security will ontain as much inlimnation as 
possible from the flight wndor, local agency, or accident investigator and construct a detailed log 
of all communication and times when the communication took place. Campus Security will 
verify with the !light vendor that all local and tcderal authorities, including Flight ScrviCl.' and thc 
Federal Aviation Administration Regional Operations Center. (H 16)426-4600, have heen 
contacted. Additionally, Campus Security will refrain from making public comment to the media, 
forwarding all requests to University Relations. 
The UNO AI will adhere to the ''Protocol Concerning the Off-Campus Death of a 
Student" provided by Dr. Mary Mudd, Vice Cham:ellor of Student Affairs ( 1999, June 9). In the 
event of a fatality of a currently-enrolled aviation student, the following guide I ines wi II hl· 
followed. 
I. Notice that the Student has died is reported by Cumpus Sl·curity (Mr. Kosel or Mr. 
Morton) to the Office of the Vice Ch<mccllor f(u Student Afli1irs. 
2. The Vice Chancellor's staff' will confirm the..~ death. Dr. Rita I knry will confirm with 
University Relations. 
3. Instructors will he contacted and asked if they would I ike someone from Counseling 
Services to speak at, or attend the first class after the student's death . 
4. Student Affairs stafTwill notify the Registrar's Office so that a notation nwy be made 
in the student's file. 
5. A letter signed by the Vice Chancellor ofStudl~nt Affairs will he Sl~nlto till' f~unily on 
behalf of the University. 
6. University Relations will he notified so that campus flags may he lowen:d on the day or 
the student's funeral. 
University Relations will he responsible l(n responding to requests for inf(Jrmation by thl· 
media. All communications must be coordinated with the FAA prior to delivering any and all 
comments. According to Ray: 
While a crisis plan eliminates some of the confusion and controls many of' the dirtic..:ultil·s 
associated with crisis, it rarely prepares the organization for the constant media assault, 
the emotional impact of the event, and damaging ini(Jrmation and headlines which 
threaten the organization's survival. (1999, p. 103) 
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Thcrcl(m:, University Relations will immediately contact the Aviation lnstitutl' l>in:dor and 
Flight Training Coordinator to notify of the situation at hand. Aviation lnstitutl~ pcrsonnl·l will 
subsequently noli fy the Department of Public Administration (~hair and the I kan of thl~ ( 'olkge 
of Public Affairs and Community Service. 
The lead spokesperson, Assistant Director l(>r Communications ami Media. Thl'resa 
Gleason, will obtain as much information as possible from Campus Security, while maintaining a 
detailed log of all communication and times when the communication took place. Additionally, 
University Relations (Ms. (!Ieason) should verify that all local and federal authorities, induding 
Flight Service and the Federal Aviation Administration Regional Operations Center haw been 
contacted. Essentially, University Relations will act as the UNOAI's voice during an accident or 
incident. providing comments, interviews, updates, and referrals to federal investigators to the 
media 
Discussion 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute has developed a program of 
preparedness in the event that a flight student is involved in an accident or serious incident. 
Although LJNOAI has been fortunate to not have experienced an accident or serious incident to 
date, the adoption of a proactive, positive, pre-accident plan is necessary in thl· event that disaster 
strikes. Other universities and tlight training centers will have the ahility to IK·ncfit fi·orn the 
premise of the checklist. This plan (provided in the accompanying appendix) will he 
continuously evaluated and updated in order to ensure that every step is taken to provide an all-
inclusive, consistent plan of action . 
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Foreword 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute is committed to providing its 
students a quality education . A key element of the University's program is the provision 
of a safe learning environment both in the classroom and in the air. Therefore, the 
University is adopting an Emergency Notification/ Response Checklist for use in the 
event that a University flight student is involved in an aircraft accident or incident. This 
plan outlines the roles of the flight vendor, as well as University of Nebraska at Omaha 
Campus Security, Student Affairs, University Relations. and the Aviation Institute. The 
goal of this plan is to eliminate uncertainty and assure that emergencies are responded 
to in an efficient manner with a clear and open flow of communication among all 
designated parties . 
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The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute, Flight Training 
Notification/Emergency Response Plan 
This plan is intended to be implemented at the four designated University of Nebraska 
at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) flight vendors: Advanced Air, Inc., Council Bluffs 
Airport; Hangar One, Inc., Millard Airport; the Offutt Aero Club, Offutt Air Force Base; 
and TAC Air, Omaha Eppley Airfield. This plan also involves the following departments 
at the University: Campus Security, University Affairs. Student Services, the College· of 
Public Affairs and Community Service, the Department of Public Administration, and the 
Aviation Institute. 
All Aviation Institute flight students are expected to file and activate FAA flight 
plans for all cross country flights. All flights will be monitored by the student's flight 
instructor or a designated official of the Flight School. 
The Federal Aviation Administration is to be contacted by the appropriate 
authorities in the event of an aircraft accident or incident. In the event of injury or 
fatality to a UNO student, Federal Aviation Administration officials will notify next of kin . 
The affected Flight Vendor and/or the University will provide assistance in locating 
contact information for next of kin. 
The initial major concern of the University will be the media requests for 
information and comments. One of the purposes of this plan is to specify the University 
Affairs Office as the University's sole point of contact for media inquiries. Refer all 
media information requests to the Lincoln Flight Standards District office and/or 
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University Affairs Office . If asked by the media or anyone not specified in this 
Emergency Response Checklist to provide additional information or personal opinions 
. advise them that "the incident is being investigated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration and further information may be obtained from them." The UNO student 
contracts directly with the flight vendor for his/her flight training, and, therefore, the flight 
vendor must work directly with all authorities and related parties to ensure that the 
response and subsequent FAA investigation is handled properly. 
Specifically, in the event an UNOAI flight student is involved in an accident or 
incident, the local flight vendor will contact: (1) Federal Aviation Administration (2) 
UNOAI representative and (3) UNO Campus Security. Campus Security will in turn 
contact Mr. Kosel or Mr. Morton as soon as possible. Either Mr. Kosel or Mr. Morton will 
then contact University Relations and Student Services, as required by Section 2.2. of 
the UNO Handbook. Campus Security will obtain as much information as possible from 
the flight vendor, local agency, or accident investigator and construct a detailed log of 
all communication and times when the communication took place. A UNO Aviation 
Institute representative and Campus Security will monitor and verify the steps outlined 
in this Emergency Response Checklist are being accomplished in a timely fashion. 
Campus Security and the UNOAI representative will refrain from making public 
comment to the media or anyone else not specified in this Emergency Response 
Checklist. forwarding all requests to the Federal Aviation Administration and/or 
University Affairs Office. 
The UNOAI will adhere to the "Protocol Concerning the Off-Campus Injury/Death 
of a Student" provided by Dr. Mary Mudd, Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs (1999, 
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June 9). In the event that a currently-enrolled aviation student has died, the following 
guidelines will be followed. 
1. Notice that the Student has died is reported by Campus Security (Mr. 
Kosel or Mr. Morton) to the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Student 
Affairs. 
2. The Student Affairs Vice Chancellor's staff will confirm the death with 
University Affairs. 
3. Instructors will be contacted and asked if they would like someone from 
Counseling Services to speak at, or attend the first class after the 
student's death. 
4. Student Affairs staff will notify the Registrar's Office so that a notation may 
be made in the student's file. 
5. A letter signed by the Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs will be sent to the 
family on behalf of the University. 
6. University Affairs will be notified so that campus flags may be lowered on 
the day of thE student's funeral. 
University Affairs will be responsible for responding to requests for information by 
the media. All communications must be coordinated with the FAA prior to delivering 
any and all comments. 
While a crisis plan eliminates some of the confusion and controls many of the 
difficulties associated with crisis, it rarely prepares the organization for the 
constant media assault, the emotional impact of the event, and damaging 
information and headlines which threaten the organization's suNival. 
University Affairs will establish and maintain cort;~munications with the Aviation 
Institute Director and/or Flight Training Coordinator to provide a unified and 
collaborative effort. 
Essentially, University Affairs will act as the UNO and Aviation Institute voice 
during an accident or incident, providing comments, inteNiews, updates, and 
FAAJNTSB referrals to the media. 
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UNOAI personnel will update the Department of Public Administration Chair and 
the Dean of the College of Public Affairs and Community Service 
Appendix A: Contact Names and Information 
(last updated 12 April, 2001) 
Note: These numbers are to be considered confidential information of the UNO Aviation 
Institute, and are not to be used, disclosed, or reproduced, in whole or in part. without 
the express consent of the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute. 
UNOAI Flight Training Vendors 
Mr. Jack Jackson; Hangar One, Millard Airport 
12916 Millard Airport Plaza: Omaha, NE 68137 ........... . 
Mr. Web Bell; Offutt Aero Club, Offutt AFB 
P.O. Box 13234; OffuttAFB, NE 68113-0234 . . ........... . 
Mr. Roy Timm; TAC Air, Omaha Eppley Airfield 
3737 Orville Plaza; Omaha, NE 68110 ............. . ..... . 
Mr. Dan Smith: Advanced Air, Inc., Council Bluffs Airport . 
UNO Campus Contacts 
Campus Security .. . .. .. . . . ... ... . . . . . ... . ...... . ........ . 
Mr. Paul Kosel, home . . .. .. . .................. . . . .... . 
-OR-
Mr. Chester Morton, home ..... . ....... . ........ . ..... . 
Univers ity Relations . .. . . . . .... . .......................... . 
Ms. Theresa Gleason. Asst. Dir. , Comm. & Media .......... . 
Student Services . . ... ..... . ... . . .. ... ............. ... .... . 
Or. Mary Mudd, Vice Chancellor. home ............... ... . 
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UNO Aviation Institute, Departmental Contacts 
Dr. Michael K. Larson ...... . .......... . . . .......... ...... . 
Pager.. . ......................................... . 
Cell. . . .......... ... ........................... . 
Home . . . .. ... . .. ..... .. . ........ . . . ... ..... ... . . 
E-mail. ........... ..... ......... . ...... . 
Dr. Brent Bowen, Director ............. .... .... ....... . .... . 
Cell (use both page & voice mail features) ................ . 
Home ..... ........... ............ ..... .. . .... ... .. . 
E-mail. .. . ....... . 
Mr. Denny Acheson, Senior Comm. Service Assoc .......... .. . . . 
Home ............... ... .... ... ..... . ..... ... .... .. . 
Department of Public Administration ........... ..... ...... .. . 
Dr Russell L. Smith, Chair, home ........... ...... . . .. .. . 
College of Public Affairs and Community Service ... . .......... . 
Or. B.J. Reed , Dean. home 
Local/Federal Authorities 
Flight Service Station, Columbus, NE . . ........... ...... .. (800) 992-7433 
FAA Central Region Operations Center , Kansas City, MO .... (816) 426-4600 
Local Authorities/Rescue ..... .. ... ....... .. .... .... ...... ...... 911 
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Dear Flight Vendor: 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) is dedicated to 
providing a safe flight environment for its students. As a designated flight vendor for the 
UNOAI, your company has been selected to train our students to become safe, 
responsible aviators. 
The UNOAI has recently r:dopted an Emergency Response Checklist (ERC) which we 
ask you use in the event that one of our students is involved in an aircraft accident or 
incident. As a UNO designated flight vendor, your primary responsibilities include the 
following: 
+ Monitor all UNO student fliQht traininQ. Efforts to locate a student will be 
initiated when a solo/dual flight is overdue by over 30 minutes. 
+ Require students to file a flight plan with FAA Flight Service for all cross 
country flights. 
+ Maintain a current student file which includes contact information for next 
of kin . 
+ Contact the appropriate local and federal authorities, including Flight 
Service [(800) 992-7433] and the Federal Aviation Administration 
Regional Operations Center [(816) 426-4600), in the event of an accident 
or incident. 
Contact a UNO Aviation Institute representative and Campus Security (24-
hour availability) at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (see list) . 
1) Inform UNOAI and Campus Security that an UNO Aviation 
h1stitute student has been involved in an accident/incident. 
2) Indicate whether the Federal Aviation Administration authorities 
have been notified or not. 
+ Obtain as much information as possible regarding the accident/incident, 
including weather conditions at the site and time, aircraft maintenance log, 
and arrange for drug/alcohol testing, if required . 
+ Refrain from making public comment to the media or anyone else 
not specified on this Emergency Response Checklist, including all 
employees. Forward all questions to the appropriate federal authorities. 
+ Train all staff regarding the procedures of the ERC, maintain a current 
copy of the ERC where it can be readily found, and provide all staff with 
updates to the ERC when issued by UNOAI. 
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The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute thanks you for your cooperation 
in this matter. Please contact me at 554-3424 should you have any questions regarding 
our Emergency Response Checklist. 
Sincerely, 




Dear Mr. Kosel and Mr. Morton: 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) is dedicated to providing 
a safe flight environment for its students. Campus Security plays an important role in this 
mission. 
The UNOAI has recently adopted an Emergency Response Checklist (ERC) which we ask 
you use in the event that one of our students is involved in an aircraft accident or incident. 
Upon notification (from any source) that an UNO Aviation student is involved: 
+ Contact University Affairs, 554-2358. and Student Services. 554-2779, as 
required by Section 2.2 of the UNO Handbook. 
+ Obtain as much information as possible from the flight vendor, loc:al agency, 
or accident investigator who has notified you. 
+ Maintain a detailed log of all communication and times when the 
communication took place. 
+ Refrain from making public comment to the media, or anyone else not 
specified on this Emergency Response Checklist, including all 
employees. Forward all questions to University Affairs, 554-2358, or to 
federal authorities. 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute thanks you for your cooperation 
in this matter. Please contact me at 554-3424 should you have any questions regarding 
our Emergency Response Checklist. You will be provided periodic updates. should the 
above stated information be amended. 
Sincerely, 




Dear Or. Mudd : 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) is dedicated to providing 
a safe fl ight environment for its students. UNO Student Services plays an important role 
in this mission. 
The UNOAI has recently adopted an Emergency Response Checklist which is to be strictly 
adhered to in the event that one of our flight students is involved in an accident or incident 
Should an emergency arise, you will be notified immediately by UNO Campus Security. 
UNO Student Services will be called upon to fulfill the foliowing roles, as outlined in UNO's 
"Protocol Concerning the Off~Campug Death of a Student": 
+ Confirmation of fatalities/injuries . Confirm with University Affairs that student 
is from UNO and is a flight student. 
+ Contact university instructors, asking is they would like someone from 
Counseling Services to speak at, or attend the first class following the 
student's death/serious injury. 
+ In the event of a student death, notify the Office of the Registrar, so that a 
notation may be made in the student's file. 
+ Mailing of a letter to the next of kin, signed by the Vice Chancellor of Student 
Affairs, on behalf of the University. 
+ Notification to University Affairs so that campus flags may be lowered on the 
day of the student's funeral. 
+ Additionally, in the event that a student is severely injured, appropriate 
communications with University Affairs and the authorities should take place. 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute thanks you for your cooperation 
in this matter. Please contact me at 554-3424 should you have any questions regarding 
our Emergency Response Checklist. You will be provided periodic updates, should the 
above stated information be amended . 
Sincerely, 




Dear Ms. Gleason: 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute (UNOAI) is dedicated to providing 
a safe flight environment for its students . UNO University Affairs plays an important role 
in this mission. 
The UNOAI has recently adopted an Emergency Response Checklist (ERC) which we ask 
you to follow in the event that one of our flight students is involved in an accident or 
incident. In this event, you will be notified by Campus Security. UNO University Affairs' 
primary responsibilities will include the following: 
+ Immediately contact and maintain communications with the Aviation Institute 
Director and/or Flight Training Coordinator to coordinate efforts. 
+ Obtain as much information as possible from Campus Security. 
+ Maintain a detailed log of all communication and times when each 
communication took place. 
+ Verify that all federal authorities, including Flight Service [(800) 992-7 433] 
and the Federal Aviation Administration Regional Operations Center [(816) 
426-4600] have been contacted. 
+ Verify that the student is from UNO and is enrolled in flight training . Obtain 
these facts from Dr. Brent Bowen or Mike Larson [554-3424] at the Aviation 
Institute or through Dr. Mudd's office, UNO Student Services [554-2779]. 
+ Provide comments, interviews and updates to the media. Please note that 
you may refer the media to federal investigators for information regarding the 
accident/incident. 
+ In the event of a student's death, communicate with UNO Student Services 
to ensure that campus flags are lowered on the day of the student's funeral. 
The University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute thanks you for your cooperation 
in this matter. Please contact me at 554-3424 should you have any questions regarding 
our Emergency Response Checklist. You will be provided periodic updates, should the 
above stated information be amended. 
Sincerely, 
Michael K. Larson 
En c. 
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